Component: Identity Registry / Verifier
Phase 4, specified but not yet implemented — no /v1/agents/{id}/enroll or /revoke route,
and no trust_anchors table, exist in this codebase today.
What it is (designed): an AAuth-compatible enrollment service plus an offline verifier. Verifies proof-of-possession, binds an agent's key to an accountable principal, and pins a trust anchor.
What it does (designed): lets a resource server verify an agent's identity offline, against a pinned JWKS, with zero network calls on the hot path.
Why identity and authorization are kept as two separate checks: "who is this agent" and "what may this agent do" answer different questions, and conflating them means a compromised or misconfigured grant could also be read as a proof of identity. A resource server admits a call only with both — identity alone, or a grant alone, is never sufficient once this ships.
Related
- Enroll and verify agent identity
- The taint and provenance model — the other Phase 4 control
- PEP — Boundary adapters — the primary consumer of offline verification